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The transition from high- to low-carbon energy sources differentially impacts financial assets. 
Low-carbon assets may benefit from lower costs of capital through a reduction in perceived 
risk as well as increased investor preference for such assets relative to high-carbon assets. 
This paper investigates whether firms’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensity affects their 
cost of equity. Using an international sample of 1,920 publicly listed firms over the years 
2002-2016, we find that industry-adjusted GHG emissions intensity positively and 
significantly impacts the cost of equity. For every unit increase in GHG emissions intensity, 
we find that the cost of equity increases by 15 basis points. This suggests that firm-level 
emissions-reduction efforts enhance firm value through a reduction in the cost of capital. 
 
Keywords: Environmental performance, Greenhouse Gas emissions, cost of capital, Socially 
Responsible Investing, Corporate Social Responsibility, asset pricing 
 










Investors show a growing concern about the impacts of economic activity on climate (Busch 
and Hoffmann, 2011). Currently, a considerable amount of financial capital is invested in a 
way that takes account of environmental impacts (GSIA, 2016). Indicators of firms’ 
Environmental Performance (EP) have become a common tool for risk management (Van 
Duuren et al., 2016). Commitments to avoid investment in the fossil fuel industry, fossil fuel 
divestment, have skyrocketed (www.gofossilfree.org/). So-called ‘low-carbon’ indexes have 
mushroomed, providing investors with a way to reduce the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions 
associated with portfolio holdings while minimizing tracking error (Andersson et al., 2016; 
De Jong and Nguyen, 2016). Another example of market interest for GHG emissions 
information is the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), which tracks the GHG emissions of 
major firms worldwide, and has been called ‘‘the most powerful green NGO you’ve never 
heard of’’ (Winston, 2010).  
 Numerous studies have identified EP as a key concern for investors with potentially 
strong financial impacts (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Scholtens, 2008; Oikonomou et al., 
2012). Reducing GHG emissions is expected to limit exposure to several key perceived 
financial risks related to the transition from high- to low-carbon sources (Andersson et al., 
2016; Busch, 2007). These include the growing public policy-, consumer-, and market 
pressures to transition from high- to low-carbon energy sources, rendering investments in 
high-carbon energy sources increasingly risky (e.g., Bauer and Hann, 2010). Good EP might 
reduce risk by mitigating reputational and image impacts (Minor and Morgan, 2011), 
financial and operational risks (McGuire et al., 1988), and fostering innovation (Porter and 
Van der Linde, 1995). Lastly, growing investor preference for low-carbon assets may lower 
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the required rate of return on such assets (Heinkel et al., 2001). This paper analyzes whether 
firms’ reduction of GHG emissions leads to a reduction of their cost of capital. 
 A key concern in the empirical literature on the effect of EP on financial performance 
(FP) is adequate measurement of EP. So far, studies have mostly relied on aggregated scores 
and indicators of EP,1 which combine large numbers of individual EP indicators. Examples 
include answers as to whether the firm publishes an environmental report, has policies in 
place to reduce emissions, or uses product labels that display environmental responsibility. 
However, the use and validity of those indicators have been criticized repeatedly (Chatterji et 
al., 2009; Chen and Delmas, 2011; Dorfleitner et al., 2015; Semenova and Hassel, 2015). A 
key limitation of EP scores is that they primarily measure firm policy, or plain ‘greenwashing’ 
activity, rather than actual reductions of environmental impacts, which affects environmental 
risks (see Chava, 2014; Gonenc and Scholtens, 2017; Nawrocka and Parker, 2009).2 In 
addition, absolute EP measures may neglect the relative nature of EP (see Cai et al., 2012). 
Lastly, even though EP scores capture a broad scope of potentially relevant environmental 
issues, it is questionable which and how much information EP scores contain (Chava, 2014; 
Dorfleitner et al., 2015; Nawrocka and Parker, 2009). EP scores are also not verified, 
validated, or replicable based on public information.3 In sum, recent studies emphasize the 
need to ‘’look beneath the surface’’ to better understand the financial impacts of EP (Delmas 
et al., 2011, p.117). 
 This paper contributes to the EP-FP literature by introducing a key transparent, 
quantitative, and relative measure of EP: industry-adjusted GHG emissions intensity. We 
                                                          
1
 The literature has generally used MSCI ESG (KLD) Stats (Chava, 2014; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) and the 
Asset4 ESG database (Gonenc and Scholtens, 2017; Gupta, 2015). However, this choice could have been driven 
by data availability (Chatterji et al., 2009).  
2
 Quite strikingly, EP scores have been found to positively correlate with levels of toxic releases and low 
environmental compliance (Delmas and Blass, 2010), and environmental strengths and concerns are positively 
related (Delmas et al., 2013; Mattingly and Berman, 2006). Doda et al. (2016) find little evidence that on average 
corporate carbon management policies have led to substantial reductions in GHG emissions. 
3
 Dorfleitner et al. (2015) compare EP scores from different ratings providers (KLD, Asset4, and Bloomberg) 
and find a lack of convergence; Horváthová (2010) and Halbritter and Dorfleitner (2015) show that empirical 
findings in the EP-FP literature are sensitive to the type of EP measure and data provider used. 
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contend that this measure is an important first step to answer the criticisms related to the 
operationalization and measurement of EP. Together with alternative cost of capital measures, 
these complement the prior literature (Chava, 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2011; 2016; Gupta, 
2015). We use an international dataset for a relatively extensive study period. Lastly, by 
adopting a panel regression framework we complement the investment portfolio literature 
(e.g., Ibikunle and Steffen, 2015) and attempt to empirically test the theoretical framework by 
Heinkel et al. (2001). 
 Using self-reported GHG emissions data for an international sample of 1,920 publicly 
listed firms over the years 2002-2016, we find that industry-adjusted GHG emissions intensity 
positively impacts the cost of equity. The effect is robust to alternative GHG emissions 
intensity measures, GHG emissions data sources, cost of equity estimations, study periods, 
and model specifications. 
 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical background on the 
hypothesized EP-CoC relationship. Sections 3 and 4 outline the methods and data used to test 




2. Theoretical background 
 
The literature has theorized that firms’ EP efforts, such as GHG emissions reductions, may 
impact firm value either positively or negatively. The trade-off hypothesis, grounded in 
agency theory (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997), argues that EP efforts come at the expense of 
shareholder value, and might be exploited by managers to increase private (reputational) 
benefits. By contrast, the risk mitigation hypothesis holds that emissions reductions can 
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increase firm value by limiting exposure to several key perceived risks. The literature on 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) has so far not reached a consensus on whether EP 
efforts come with net financial benefits (Endrikat et al., 2014). We contend that the significant 
policy- and market mechanisms on climate change render the effect of reducing GHG 
emissions on the size of future cash flows ambiguous. Instead, we argue that risk is the main 
channel of interest to assess the value-relevance of GHG emissions reduction efforts. 
 We follow the microeconomic literature on EP (Dam and Scholtens, 2015; Fama and 
French, 2007; Heinkel et al., 2001; Mackey and Mackey, 2007), which has theorized that 
investor preference for low-carbon assets lowers the required rate of return on such assets. By 
contrast, high-carbon firms see their investor bases reduced, leading investors in them to 
demand higher returns for the increased risk they bear due to impaired diversification (risk-
sharing). The literature has identified three main transmission mechanisms that explain the 
value-relevance of EP efforts. First, Bollen (2007), Ballestero et al. (2012), and others 
theorize that the utility function of some investors includes non-financial considerations, such 
as firms’ contribution to climate change. A second way in which EP can increase the investor 
base is by reducing asymmetric information with the investors (Heinkel et al., 2001 following 
Merton, 1987). EP information may signal a ‘responsible’ image (Dhaliwal et al., 2009) and 
increases media, reporting, and analyst coverage (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Finally, 
reductions in emissions and exposure to high-carbon assets reduce the perceived risk of 
assets. As outlined in Section 1, reducing GHG emissions is expected to limit the exposure to 
several financial risks related to the transition from high- to low-carbon sources (see 
Andersson et al., 2016; Busch, 2007; De Jong and Nguyen, 2016). Examples are the growing 
public policy-, consumer-, and market pressures to transition from high- to low-carbon energy 
sources, which render investments in high-carbon energy sources increasingly risky (e.g., 
Bauer and Hann, 2010). Good EP might further reduce financial and operational risks 
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(McGuire et al., 1988), social and environmental risks (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008), and 
decrease the incidence of (negative) shocks related to future regulation, litigation, and 
reputational harm through increased stakeholder loyality (Bouslah et al., 2013; Cai et al., 
2016; Minor and Morgan, 2011; Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria, 2004; Nofsinger and Varma, 
2014). Porter and Van der Linde (1995) have argued that EP enhances competitiveness 
through innovation. 
 Based on the microeconomic framework outlined above, we hypothesize that firms 
with low-GHG emissions intensity benefit from lower costs of capital.4 
 This paper closely relates to recent studies by Chava (2014), El Ghoul et al. (2011; 
2016), Gupta (2015), and Sharfman and Fernando (2008), which generally find a negative 
relationship between EP ratings and the cost of equity (CoE). However, Chava (2014) finds 
that the CoE is only significantly impacted by environmental weaknesses, while there is no 
effect of environmental strengths. Boermans and Galema (2017) identify a potential trade-off 
for pension funds between returns and environmental objectives. With respect to the cost of 
debt (CoD), Bauer and Hann (2010) show a negative relationship between EP and corporate 
bond spreads. Chava (2014) and Goss and Roberts (2011) show that environmental concerns 
relate to higher CoD. Bouslah et al. (2013) and Cai et al. (2016) find that environmental 
strengths reduce risk. Our study further relates to the literature investigating the return 
performance of ‘green’ investment portfolios (Ibikunle and Steffen, 2015) and fossil-free 
portfolios (Trinks et al., 2017). Lastly, a few recent studies specifically use GHG emissions 
data as well. Liesen et al. (2017) form portfolios based on GHG emissions disclosure and 
emissions intensity, and Görgen et al. (2017) propose a ‘carbon risk factor’. Another stream of 
                                                          
4
 The hypothesis that GHG emissions information is priced assumes semi-strong market efficiency, implying that 
investors act on publicly available GHG emissions data. Emissions data have been available to investors for a 
large number of firms through annual reports, mainstream financial channels (Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, 
MSCI/WRDS) and non-financial ones (SRI industry and rating agencies), particularly for the last few years. 
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literature has focused on the effect of GHG emissions data disclosure on the cost of capital 





This section outlines the methods used to test our main hypothesis that GHG emissions 
intensity adversely affects the CoE. To measure the impact of EP on CoE, it is vital to account 
for omitted variable biases such as unobserved firm heterogeneity (Horváthová, 2010). This 
motivates our use of panel regression methods5 instead of two alternative approaches, namely 
event studies and portfolio studies (see Ambec and Lanoine, 2008). Panel regression also 
facilitates making reasonable causal inferences based on economic theory. We adopt the 
following fixed-effects model, which includes year-fixed effects, and estimate it using robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level: 
 
, = 	 + 	, + , +  + ,   (1) 
 
, is our estimate of the cost of equity (CoE) for firm  at time  (see Section 3.1). 
	, measures the GHG emissions intensity of firm  at time  (see Section 
3.2). We lag GHG intensity by one year to ensure information on GHG emissions has been 
fully disseminated to all investors, and to (partially) address potential issues related to reverse 
causality and simultaneity (Jo and Harjoto, 2014). , is a set of control variables used in the 
related literature (see Section 3.3).  is a year dummy capturing time-varying unobserved 
                                                          
5
 Chava (2014) notes that panel regressions are preferred over Fama and MacBeth (1973) month-by-month 
cross-sectional regressions because of the short time series available for EP variables. 
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effects. The error term,	,, allows for firm heterogeneity and industry and country 
unobserved effects (Horváthová, 2010).  
 
3.1.Cost of capital 
 We estimate the CoE by performing Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) regressions 
based on prior ten years arithmetric average daily returns.6 This is in line with Sharfman and 
Fernando (2008), but contrasts with Chava (2014), El Ghoul et al. (2011; 2016), and Gupta 
(2015), who use the internal rate of return implied in current stock prices and analyst earnings 
forecasts to estimate the CoE. This method, however, has various drawbacks, such as the 
existence of various biases in analyst forecasts, poor data availability (there is only a 30% 
match between I/B/E/S and GHG emissions data), and the finding by Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2015) that analyst recommendations interact with CSR. CAPM is common practice 
(Armitage, 2005; Damodaran, 2016) and theoretically appealing (Perold, 2004). Nevertheless, 
we recognize that realized historical returns may be an imperfect proxy for expected returns 
(Elton, 1999; Fama and French, 1997).7 For robustness, we use different asset pricing models 
(Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997), a different market factor (MSCI World index), 5-, 2-
, and 1-year estimation windows (Carleton and Lakonishok, 1985; Damodaran, 2016), 
geometric averaging, and weekly and monthly returns (see Section 5.2). 
 
3.2.GHG emissions intensity 
 GHG intensity is measured as total GHG emissions (measured in metric tonnes of 
CO2-equivalents) scaled by net sales. GHG intensity has been promoted by Hoffmann and 
Busch (2008), and used by Görgen et al. (2017), among others, as a straightforward, 
transparent, and relative indicator of a key environmental impact of business activitiy. As 
                                                          
6
 Arithmetic return averaging is theoretically recommended (Armitage, 2005) and provides plausible CoE 
estimates. In Section 5.2, we check the robustness of our results against using geometric return averaging. 
7
 Note, however, that we analyze the differences in CoE, making the precision of estimates less important. 
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such, the measure should be a key variable determining the environmental risks in firms as 
well as investor preferences for environmental responsibility. We adjust GHG intensity for the 
industry market-capitalization-weighted average intensity in the year. This addresses the 
relative nature of emissions reduction efforts in different industries and years, and aligns with 
the standard practice of best-in-class selection in SRI. We use the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), which divides firms into 10 industries (ICB1), 19 supersectors (ICB2), 41 
sectors (ICB3), and 114 subsectors (ICB4). 
 We acknowledge that relying on GHG intensity may constitute an imperfect measure 
of the actual efforts taken by firms to reduce GHG emissions. First, intensity ignores trade-
offs between GHG emissions and other ‘inputs’. Firms may show increased intensity solely 
due to a substitution between production factors, which can result from modernization, 
sectoral changes in the economy, and changes in national energy mixes. In addition, intensity 
generally overstates the extent to which energy efficiency improvements have occurred, 
particularly during recessions, as energy consumption does not fall as much as production and 
as consumption is driven by energy input prices. A refined measurement of EP would account 
for the relative GHG efficiency of the firms based on a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
framework. Addressing these issues is beyond the scope of this paper though. However, we 
argue that GHG intensity provides a useful, straightforward, and transparent measure of EP 
that makes an important contribution to the EP-FP literature. 
 
3.3.Control variables 
 In line with the literature, we control for Beta, measured as the factor loading in a 
CAPM cross-sectional regression of daily excess returns on the global market factor over the 
previous ten years, Size, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, financial leverage 
(Lev), defined as total debt over total assets, Market-to-Book (MTB), defined as the ratio of 
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the market value of equity relative to the book value of equity, Return on Assets (ROA), 
defined as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets, and Sales growth, 
defined as the one-year increase in net sales. Beta (systematic risk) is expected to positively 
relate to expected stock returns (Sharpe, 1964). Larger firms can be considered less risky 
(Fama and French, 1993), as they, among other things, may benefit from lower operating and 
financial risk (Jo and Harjoto, 2014). Size may also proxy for visibility and stakeholder risk 
(Udayasankar, 2008) and increased analyst coverage and attention, which might reduce 
information asymmetry and the CoC. Leverage is known to positively relate to the CoC by 
increasing default risk (Fama and French, 1992; Gonenc and Scholtens, 2017). A low MTB 
ratio is an indicator of financial distress as well. Consequently, low-MTB firms are expected 
to earn higher ex post returns (Fama and French, 1992; Galema et al., 2008). Weak 
profitability (low ROA) may motivate cuts in EP. Improved sales growth signals solvency 
(Bradley and Chen, 2015). 
 As a robustness check, we include a battery of additional control variables. We 
consider return volatility (RetVol1yr) to account for total risk, defined as the standard 
deviation of the daily returns over the previous year (see El Ghoul et al., 2016; Chava, 2014). 
We further include Research and Development (R&D) intensity (RDIntTA), measured as 
R&D expenses over total assets (cf. Gonenc and Scholtens, 2017; Rezec, 2016). A high R&D 
intensity could correspond with increased levels of risk. Moreover, EP may proxy for R&D 
which is linked to FP (Lioui and Sharma, 2012). We do not include R&D intensity in our 
main regression specification, as it reduces our sample by more than 50% (cf. Rezec, 2016) 
and does not enter significantly in our regressions. We also control for Capex intensity 
(CapexTA), measured as capital expenditures over total assets, and Capital intensity, 
measured as Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) over total assets, as both have been found 
12 
 
to proxy for firms’ financial risks (Bauer and Hann, 2010). We control for liquidity effects 






 We obtain self-reported data on GHG emissions of publicly listed firms at end-of-June 
from Thomson Reuters’ Asset4 database and Bloomberg ESG data for 2002-2016. Asset4 
gathers GHG emissions data for each fiscal year from public sources, mostly annual and CSR 
reports. Bloomberg additionally provides data on GHG emissions as reported to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP)8 survey. As the data sources represent two different channels which 
provide different GHG emissions figures, including both data sources increases robustness. 
 We focus on Scope 1 and 2 emissions. Reporting on Scope 3 emissions is currently 
poor and not yet widespread, and Scope 3 emissions are largely outside the direct control of 
the firm. Figure 1 shows the number of firms which report on each of the Scopes over the 
years. We calculate total GHG emissions as the sum of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions 
provided that both scopes are reported9 (in contrast with other studies (e.g., Liesen et al., 
2017; Görgen et al., 2017, which simply take the sum), to ensure comparability in terms of 
total emissions. Additionally, as a robustness check, we restrict our sample to 2008-2016 
because correspondence with Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg underlined the poorer quality 
of corporate GHG emissions reporting in years before 2008. In addition, the number of 
reporting firms is very low before 2008 (cf. Görgen et al., 2017), which might be problematic 
                                                          
8
 For a list of studies using CDP data, see: https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Results/Pages/academic-data.aspx 
(accessed: August 22, 2017). 
9
 Correspondence with Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg assured this method maximizes consistency as firms 
may report a total figure for which it is unknown which scopes are included. A further benefit of manual 
summation of Scopes 1 and 2 is that it eliminates any errors in the total emissions data entries. 
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for obtaining plausible industry-average intensities. For robustness, we also extend our sample 
using Scopes 1-3 emissions as well as focusing on Scope 1 only. Additionally, from 
Bloomberg, we obtain information on the proportion of the emissions that have been 
externally verified, indicating whether reported emissions are consistent with the reporting 
guidelines (GHG protocol), and the level of uncertainty reported by the firm, indicating the 
level of estimation or extrapolation used to determine the reported total emissions. Results of 
the above robustness analyses are in Tables A.4, A.5, and A.7. 
 Self-reported GHG emissions data have several limitations. Most notably, there is no 
standard or regulation for reporting on GHG emissions. This reduces the quality and 
reliability of GHG emissions data, which in turn limits their value to investors (see Adamsson 
et al., 2016; Schaltegger et al., 2016; Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012). However, reporting has 
become more standardized in recent years. Also, ‘’looking at emissions over longer time 
frames and for a large group of businesses gives a reasonable actionable level of information 
on how firms’ GHG emissions are evolving’’.10 Relatedly, the GHG emissions figure from 
Asset4 and Bloomberg does not guarantee that all GHGs are included, as firms may differ in 
terms of which GHGs they report about. Still, the reported GHG emissions figure is the 
information that investors have and might or might not act on, which is an empirical issue. 
 
4.2.Environmental performance scores and institutional shareownership 
 We further obtain EP scores from Asset4 to relate our GHG intensity with the EP-CoC 
literature using EP scores (in Section 4.5) (Chava, 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2011; 2016; Gupta, 
2015). ENVSCORE is the overall EP rating from Asset4, which is based on three EP 
subcategories. ENVPILLAR1-3 represent the subcategory ratings for emissions reduction, 
product innovation, and resource reduction respectively. A4IR is the overall sustainability 
                                                          
10
 https://www.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/corporate/Reports/global-500-
greenhouse-gases-performance-trends-2010-2013.pdf (accessed: August 29, 2017). 
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rating from Asset4, which is comprised of environmental, social, governance, and economic 
performance. 
 In addition, the literature has identified that sustainable or high-EP firms benefit from 
a larger institutional investor base, possibly due to their visibility and greater sensitivity to 
social norms (Chava, 2014; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Therefore, we compare (in Section 
4.5) high- and low-GHG intensity firms in terms of their average percentage of shares 
outstanding held by institutional investors, excluding investment firms, which can include less 
visible mutual funds, etc. (as in Bouslah et al., 2013; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). 
 
 




 We obtain financial variables from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg, 
consistent with the data source used for GHG emission data. In line with the international 










Figure 1: Number of non-financial firms reporting GHG emissions  
CO2e Asset4 Total figure
CO2e Scope 1
CO2e Scope 2
CO2e Total (Scopes 1 and 2 available)
CO2e Scope 3
CO2e Total (Scopes 1, 2, and 3)
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(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/ faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). We winsorize all 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 After removing firms belonging to the financial sector and those which report on an 
unconsolidated basis, we end up with a sample of 1,920 firms. Our sample has a highly 
international outlook and is unequally distributed over years, industries, and countries, as 
shown in Tables A.1-A.3. Our sample is larger than that of El Ghoul et al. (2016) and 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008), but smaller than Chava (2014), El Ghoul et al. (2011), and 
Gupta (2015), as coverage of GHG emissions data is relatively low compared to EP ratings. 
 
4.4.Summary statistics and correlations 
 GHG emissions vary strongly across firms, as shown by the substantial standard 
deviation of the total GHG emissions figure (see Table 1). The strong variation in total GHG 
emissions and GHG emissions intensity underlines the importance of controlling for industry 
differences in carbon intensity. Moreover, we find a substantial difference in the mean and 
median total GHG emissions. This indicates that there are a few big emitters and a majority of 
much less-emitting firms.11 We performed several cross checks to verify the cross-sectional 
and time variation in the carbon intensity. We confirm that these are plausible, in the sense 
that they are consistent with the (publicly) reported values of emissions and sales.  
 Against expectations, we do not find GHG intensity to be strongly correlated with the 
CoE (see Table 2). Also, contrary to the literature using EP scores (e.g., Chava, 2014), we 
find that GHG intensity is only weakly negatively correlated with the percentage of 
institutional investors. Interestingly, we find that GHG intensity only weakly negatively 
correlates with the EP scores from Asset4. ENVPILLAR1, which measures the firm’s policy 
on emissions reductions, does not seem to relate strongly to the firm’s actual reductions in 
                                                          
11
 As a robustness check, we check and confirm that removing the 10th and 90th percentile total GHG emissions 
does not qualitatively change the results. 
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GHG intensity levels. The weak correlation between GHG intensity and EP scores highlights 
the conceptual differences of both indicators. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of key EP variables (Panel A) and financial variables (Panel B) 
Panel A: EP variables 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
GHG emissions total (tCO2e) 10,091 4,602,107 495,730 12,240,216 2,566 81,000,000 4.35 23.65 
GHG intensity (tCO2e/net sales) 10,047 0.39 0.06 0.90 0.00 5.94 4.24 23.08 
GHG intensity, industry-adjusted 10,047 0.14 -0.02 0.82 -0.97 5.35 4.31 24.74 
         
Panel B: Financial variables         
 N Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
CoE 21,744 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.56 3.01 
Beta 21,744 0.61 0.55 0.33 0.05 1.48 0.58 2.71 
Size (ln, USD thousands) 25,852 15.43 15.48 1.56 11.10 18.99 -0.20 2.99 
MTB 24,666 1.67 1.38 0.91 0.67 5.91 2.29 9.35 
Lev 25,822 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.74 0.52 2.96 
ROA 25,407 0.07 0.06 0.08 -0.23 0.33 -0.15 6.50 
Salesgrowth 23,896 0.08 0.07 0.22 -0.59 0.88 0.44 5.62 
% Institutional shareholdings 26,044 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.65 5.70 36.77 
 
 
 Table 2: pairwise correlations between key variables 
Panel A: GHG intensity and financial variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CoE (1) 1.00 
GHG intensity, industry-adjusted (2) 0.01 1.00 
Beta (3) 0.72 -0.04 1.00       
Size (4) -0.20 0.04 0.28 1.00 
MTB (5) 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.27 1.00 
Lev (6) 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.21 -0.14 1.00 
ROA (7) -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.55 -0.18 1.00 
Salesgrowth (8) -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.24 1.00 
% Institutional shareholdings (9) -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.01 1.00 
          
Panel B: GHG intensity and Asset EP ratings          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
GHG intensity, industry-adjusted (1) 1.00         
ENVSCORE (2) -0.06 1.00        
ENVPILLAR1 (3) -0.01 0.87 1.00       
ENVPILLAR2 (4) -0.07 0.80 0.52 1.00      
ENVPILLAR3 (5) -0.09 0.86 0.73 0.50 1.00     




 To compare the GHG intensity measure with commonly used EP scores (El Ghoul et 
al., 2011; Gupta, 2015), we divide the sample into high (above median) and low (below 
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median) industry-adjusted GHG intensity firms.12 Interesting, we find that low-GHG intensity 
firms have significantly lower EP scores; even the ENVPILLAR1 score, which represents 
firms’ emissions reduction policies, is significantly lower for low-GHG intensity firms. This 
further supports the concerns that commonly used EP scores are an imperfect measure of 
actual GHG emissions reductions made by firms. We further test whether institutional 
shareownership is higher for low-GHG intensity firms (cf. Chava, 2014; Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009). We do not find institutional shareownership to be significantly higher for 
low-GHG intensity firms. Finally, with respect to the CoE we find that low-GHG intensity 
firms on average have 0.1% lower CoE than firms with high GHG intensity. However, it is 
likely that other factors (e.g., leverage and firm size), more than low-GHG intensity, are the 
main drivers of the lower CoE. To test our hypothesis that GHG intensity positively affects 
the CoE, we must disentangle these effects through multivariate regressions, which we will 
present in the next section. 
 
Table 3: Univariate test of means 
(1) 
Low-GHG intensity  
(N = 5,023) 
(2) 
High-GHG intensity  
(N = 5,024) 
(1) - (2)  
 
Difference t-test 
CoE 0.0560 0.0570 -0.0010* 
% Institutional shareholdings 0.0585 0.0608 -0.0022 
    
ENVSCORE 75.9815 77.4515 -1.4700*** 
ENVPILLAR1 76.2624 78.7934 -2.5310*** 
ENVPILLAR2 66.6649 65.6134 -1.0515* 
ENVPILLAR3 75.2460 77.3061 -2.0601*** 
A4IR 76.0377 77.1953 -1.1576*** 
This table reports mean difference tests for low-GHG intensity (below-median GHG intensity) and high-GHG 
intensity (above-median GHG intensity) subsamples. GHG intensity is the one-year lagged GHG intensity 
(GHG emissions/net sales) minus the industry- (ICB1) market-capitalization-weighted average GHG intensity in 
the corresponding year. CoE is estimated using the CAPM using prior ten years daily excess returns. % 
Institutional shareholdings is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors, excluding 
investment firms. ENVSCORE is the overall EP rating from Asset4, and ENVPILLAR1-3 represent the 
subcategory ratings for emissions reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction respectively. A4IR is 




                                                          
12
 When defining high- and low-GHG intensity by the 30th/70th, 20th/80th, or 10th/90th percentiles, results are 






 We perform fixed-effects regressions (Eq.1) to test the effect of GHG intensity on the 
CoE (see Table 5). We find a positive effect of lagged industry-adjusted GHG intensity on the 
CoE, which is significant at the 5% level. We find that every unit increase in the industry-
adjusted GHG intensity, ceteris paribus, increases next year’s CoE by 15bps. Conversely, 
reducing the GHG intensity by, for example, 0.3 per year, which are frequently observed in 
our sample, has a modest CoE-reducing impact of 5bps. The control variables’ coefficients all 
have the expected sign and are also mostly statistically significant in our regressions. 
 Our findings support the risk mitigation hypothesis, which holds that emissions 
reductions can increase firm value by limiting exposure to several key perceived risks. Firms 
with low relative GHG emissions tend to benefit from a lower required rate of return (cost of 
capital). This might result from growing investor preference for low- instead of high-carbon 
assets as well as the increased perceived riskiness of high-carbon assets.  
 
5.2.Robustness 
 We assess the robustness of our results to 1) alternative GHG intensity measures, 2) 
alternative GHG emissions data source (CDP survey), 3) CoE estimation (asset pricing model, 
market factor, estimation window, averaging method, and data frequency), 4) subperiods, 5) 
and omitted variables and reverse causality concerns.  
 First, we consider the robustness of our results to alternative scaling of GHG 
emissions (by total assets or market capitalization), correcting GHG intensity for sector- as 
well as country-average GHG intensity, and focusing on Scope 1 only and Scopes 1, 2, and 3 
combined. Results are qualitatively similar across GHG intensity measures, but are not 
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significant anymore when considering Scope 1 only or Scopes 1, 2, and 3 combined (see 
Table A.4). 
 
Table 4: Cost of equity regression 
  



















Number of id 1,694 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
  
This table shows the fixed-effects regressions of the CoE on our relative GHG intensity measure and control 
variables. CoE is estimated using the CAPM using prior ten years daily excess returns. L.GHG intensity is the 
one-year lagged GHG intensity (GHG emissions/net sales) minus the industry- (ICB1) market-capitalization-
weighted average GHG intensity in the corresponding year. Beta is the factor loading in a CAPM regression of 
prior ten years daily excess returns on the global market factor. Size is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization. MTB is market value of equity to book value of equity. Lev is total debt over total assets. ROA is 
return on assets. Sales growth is the % one-year growth in net sales. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Second, we we rerun our analyses replacing GHG emissions data from publicly 
available sources (Asset4) with data from the CDP survey (Bloomberg). We find that the EP-
CoE relationship is generally stronger compared to our main analysis (see Table A.5). 
Differences might result from sample differences between the two data providers. An 
alternative explanation is our finding that emissions figures reported to the CDP survey tend 
to be somewhat higher than those being reported in annual reports. We include the CDP 
variable indicating the firm’s level of uncertainty about the reported emissions figure. 
Interestingly, we find that uncertainty about Scope 1 emissions reduces the effect of GHG 
20 
 
intensity on the CoE. This finding seems to emphasize the importance to investors of reliable 
GHG emissions reporting (consistent with Rezec, 2016). 
 Results on CoE estimation, reported in Table A.6, show that our results are generally 
robust to different CoE estimation procedures (asset pricing model, market factor, estimation 
window, averaging method, and data frequency). The only exception is the weaker effect 
when using a 5-year estimation window.  
 In Table A.7, we find that the effect of GHG emissions intensity on the CoE is stable 
across three-year subperiods. The effect size tends to be somewhat larger in more recent time 
frames, which is suggestive of the growing investor preference for low-carbon assets. 
 To address concerns about potential omitted variable biases, we add additional control 
variables to our main model, described in section 3.3, and compare our findings with the 
model specifications of related studies (Chava, 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2011; 2016). From 
Table A.8, we find that results are somewhat different across model specifications. However, 
potentially important variables, such as R&D intensity and liquidity, do not enter significantly 
in the regression. This contrasts with the finding by Lioui and Sharma (2012), who emphasize 
the potential moderating role of R&D intensity in a CSR-FP framework. Also, note that 
differences might be driven by the restricted sample size due to poor data availability. 
 Lastly, a potential concern raised in the literature (e.g., Scholtens, 2008) is reverse 
causality in the EP-CoC relationship. However, we find little theoretical reasons why CoE 
might drive GHG intensity. Table A.9 further alleviates the concerns that might subsist as 
only three-, two-, and one-year lagged GHG intensity significantly positively relates to CoE, 






6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Climate-related risks have become a growing concern in capital markets. This study is among 
the first to investigate whether a key indicator of environmental impact, GHG emissions 
intensity, lowers the returns required by investors. Our main finding is that firms’ industry-
adjusted GHG intensity positively relates to their cost of equity (CoE). This finding is robust 
to using alternative GHG emissions intensity measures, GHG emissions data sources, and 
CoE estimation. We do find a weaker CoE effect for earlier periods as well as when adopting 
alternative model specifications. We do not find any evidence of potential edogeneity 
concerns. In all, we find strong support for the hypothesis that reducing the impact on climate 
can increase firm value by lowering the returns required by investors. This might result from 
growing investor preference for low- instead of high-carbon assets as well as the increased 
perceived riskiness of high-carbon assets.  
 Our findings are consistent with and complement the closely related studies by Chava 
(2014), El Ghoul et al. (2011), El Ghoul et al. (2016), Gupta (2015), and Sharfman and 
Fernando (2008), which have identified a negative relationship between Environmental 
Performance (EP) scores and the CoE. Our finding that GHG emissions intensity lowers the 
required rate of return is also in line with Bouslah et al. (2013) and Cai et al. (2016) who 
specifically show the risk-reducing effects of EP. Our results are furthermore in line with 
portfolio studies by Ibikunle and Steffen (2015) and Boermans and Galema (2017), but 
contrast with Liesen et al. (2017) and Görgen et al. (2017). As the latter two studies focus on 
realized returns instead of expected returns, they do not directly test the risk mitigation 
hypothesis. Moreover, Liesen et al. (2017) use a limited sample size and study period and 
report only weakly significant results. Additionally, while Görgen et al. (2017) find negative 
returns on a ‘Brown-minus-Green’ carbon risk mimicking factor, the authors do not capture 
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industry-adjusted carbon intensity and their results show a significant carbon risk premium for 
2012-onwards. Finally, our results are consistent with the findings of Clarkson et al. (2013) 
and Rezec (2016), which underline the CoE-reducing impacts of GHG emissions disclosure. 
 These findings have important implications for managers, investors, and regulators. 
First, our results indicate that managers should consider the value-relevance of GHG 
emissions reductions and disclosure. Growing investor preferences for low- instead of high-
carbon assets fuels this mechanism. For investors, low-carbon investing may reduce exposure 
to climate-related risks, but our findings underline its costs in terms of lower expected returns. 
Our findings further underline the important role of capital markets in providing a promising 
(partial) solution to market and regulatory failures in the area of climate change by effectively 
rewarding emissions-reduction efforts through a reduction in the cost of capital. 
 We feel that the main limitation of our study is the currently limited and non-
standardized way of GHG emissions reporting. However, we contend that the proposed 
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Table A.1: GHG emissions data coverage by data source: 
Number of observations per year 
Public reports (Asset4) CDP survey (Bloomberg) 
2002 27 - 
2003 50 - 
2004 89 - 
2005 202 - 
2006 317 55 
2007 388 265 
2008 508 443 
2009 990 625 
2010 1,152 824 
2011 1,310 980 
2012 1,393 1,041 
2013 1,253 1,107 
2014 1,287 1,162 
2015 1,150 1,204 
2016 82* 1,174* 
Total 10,092 8,880 





Table A.2: Firm-year observations by country 
Country Freq. Percent 
US 6,240 21.68 
GB 4,470 15.53 
JP 2,850 9.90 
CA 1,605 5.58 
AU 1,515 5.26 
FR 1,185 4.12 
ZA 1,170 4.06 
KR 915 3.18 
DE 870 3.02 
TW 825 2.87 
BR 690 2.40 
SE 555 1.93 
CH 525 1.82 
ES 510 1.77 
IN 495 1.72 
HK 390 1.35 
NL 375 1.30 
Other 3,600 12.51 








Table A.3: Firm-year observations by industry (ICB level 1) 
ICB1 Industry name Firm-year obs Percent 
1 Oil & Gas 2,205 7.66 
1000 Basic Materials 4,020 13.97 
2000 Industrials 7,125 24.75 
3000 Consumer Goods 4,110 14.28 
4000 Health Care 1,620 5.63 
5000 Consumer Services 4,320 15.01 
6000 Telecommunications 1,170 4.06 
7000 Utilities 1,800 6.25 
9000 Technology 2,415 8.39 





Table A.4: Cost of equity regressions with different GHG intensity measures 


















       
L.GHG 
intensity 
0.0015*** 0.0027** -0.0002 0.0023** 0.0006 0.0007 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
       
Observations 8,365 8,365 8,365 7,437 9,026 4,759 
R-squared 0.8316 0.8315 0.8313 0.7478 0.8343 0.8288 
Number of id 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,655 1,700 1,189 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the fixed-effects regressions of the CoE on different GHG intensity measures and control 
variables. CoE is estimated using the CAPM using prior ten years daily excess returns. L.GHG intensity is the 
one-year lagged GHG intensity, measured as GHG emissions/net sales (1), GHG emissions/total assets (2), GHG 
emissions/market cap (3), GHG emissions Scope 1/net sales (5), GHG emissions Scopes 1+2+3/net sales (6), 
minus the industry- (ICB1) market-capitalization-weighted average GHG intensity in the corresponding year. 
Specification (4) replaces the industry-average with the sector- (ICB3) average intensity. All regression include 
the control variables described in section 3.3. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in 












Table A.5: Cost of equity regressions with GHG emissions data from CDP survey 
   
L.GHG intensity 0.0029** 0.0110*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0035) 
L.GHG intensity x L(uncertainty 
Scope 1) 
 -0.0441* 
  (0.0231) 
L.GHG intensity x L(uncertainty 
Scope 2) 
 -0.0001 
  (0.0205) 
   
Observations 7,383 5,007 
R-squared 0.7745 0.7738 
Number of id 1,177 1,128 
Controls Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
This table shows the fixed-effects regressions of the CoE on our relative GHG intensity measure and control 
variables. CoE is estimated using the CAPM using prior ten years daily excess returns. L.GHG intensity is the 
one-year lagged GHG intensity (GHG emissions/net sales) minus the industry- (ICB1) market-capitalization-
weighted average GHG intensity in the corresponding year. L.GHG intensity x L(uncertainty Scope 1) and 
L.GHG intensity x L(uncertainty Scope 2) are interaction terms capturing the moderating effect of uncertainty 
about reported emissions data. All regression include the control variables described in section 3.3. Robust 




Table A.6: Cost of equity regressions with different CoE specifications 























         
L.GHG 
intensity 
0.0015*** 0.0038** 0.0040** 0.0013** 0.0013*** 0.0018*** 0.0032** 0.0056*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0019) 
         
Observations 8,365 8,365 8,365 8,365 8,365 8,335 8,962 9,149 
R-squared 0.8316 0.2299 0.2281 0.8310 0.8310 0.7821 0.8330 0.8528 
Number of 
id 
1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,690 1,779 1,816 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the fixed-effects regressions of various CoE estimates on our main relative GHG intensity 
measure and control variables. In our main specification (1), the CoE is estimated using the CAPM using prior 
ten years daily excess returns. The main estimation results are shown when replacing the CAPM with the Fama-
French model (2) or Carhart model (3), replacing the Global market factors with the MSCI World index (4), 
geometric averaging of daily returns instead of arithmetic averaging (5), relying on monthly return data instead 
of daily return data (6), and employing an estimation window of 5 years (7) or 2 years (8). L.GHG intensity is 
the one-year lagged GHG intensity (GHG emissions/net sales) minus the industry- (ICB1) market-capitalization-
weighted average GHG intensity in the corresponding year. All regression include the control variables 
described in section 3.3. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 




Table A.7: Cost of equity regressions for subperiods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 












         
L.GHG 
intensity 
0.0015*** 0.0016** 0.0008 0.0034*** 0.0034** 0.0005 0.0001 0.0008** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
         
Observations 8,365 7,801 2,655 3,461 4,241 4,486 4,634 4,006 
R-squared 0.8316 0.8208 0.8339 0.8061 0.8259 0.8559 0.8566 0.8899 
Number of id 1,694 1,676 1,126 1,271 1,407 1,490 1,549 1,510 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the fixed-effects regressions of the CoE on our main relative GHG intensity measure and 
control variables for various subperiods. CoE is estimated using the CAPM using prior ten years daily excess 
returns. L.GHG intensity is the one-year lagged GHG intensity (GHG emissions/net sales) minus the industry- 
(ICB1) market-capitalization-weighted average GHG intensity in the corresponding year. All regression include 
the control variables described in section 3.3. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in 














El Ghoul et al. 
(2016) 
(5) 
El Ghoul et al. 
(2011) 
      
L.GHG intensity 0.0015*** 0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Beta 0.0628*** 0.0622***    
 (0.0020) (0.0030)    
Size -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0009 
 (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
MTB 0.0011*** 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Lev 0.0087*** 0.0110** 0.0038 0.0042 0.0046 
 (0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
ROA 0.0007 -0.0065    
 (0.0027) (0.0050)    
Salesgrowth 0.0003 0.0008    
 (0.0009) (0.0014)    
RetVol1yr  -0.3370*** -0.3235*** -0.3207***  
  (0.0450) (0.0305) (0.0302)  
L.m_ExcessRet  0.0040 0.0042**   
  (0.0028) (0.0020)   
RDIntTA  -0.0211    
  (0.0317)    
NWC  0.0000    
  (0.0000)    
Constant 0.0355*** 0.0538** 0.0881*** 0.0883*** 0.0689*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0233) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0190) 
      
Observations 8,365 3,597 8,381 8,437 8,443 
R-squared 0.8316 0.8409 0.7651 0.7653 0.7565 
Number of id 1,694 811 1,689 1,700 1,700 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the fixed-effects regressions of various model specifications, following closely related studies. 
L.GHG intensity is the one-year lagged GHG intensity (GHG emissions/net sales) minus the industry- (ICB1) 
market-capitalization-weighted average GHG intensity in the corresponding year. All control variables are 
described in section 3.3. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 




Table A.9: Main specification using different lag orders for GHG intensity 













            
L.GHG 
intensity 
0.0000 0.0009 0.0019*** 0.0027*** 0.0015*** 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0014** -0.0014*** 0.0000 0.0008 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
            
Obs 3,853 5,051 6,213 7,307 8,365 8,778 8,496 8,187 7,795 7,323 6,810 
R2 0.8626 0.8615 0.8563 0.8436 0.8316 0.8244 0.8272 0.8338 0.8437 0.8598 0.8717 
Firms 1,243 1,397 1,526 1,630 1,694 1,711 1,648 1,601 1,545 1,479 1,435 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table shows the fixed-effects regressions of our main specification using different lag orders for GHG intensity. L.GHG intensity is the GHG 
intensity (GHG emissions/net sales) minus the industry- (ICB1) market-capitalization-weighted average GHG intensity in the corresponding year. All 
regression include the control variables described in section 3.3. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
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